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IV.

JURISDICTION

This is an appeal from a final order or judgment from a court
of record in a criminal case and does not involve a conviction of
a first-degree or capital felony.

Accordingly, the Utah Court of

Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-3(2)(f)

and Utah R.App.3(a).
This case involves two misdemeanor convictions (one "A11 and
one "B") joined in one case in the Fifth Judicial District Court,
in and for Washington County, State of Utah.

There is no longer a

Circuit Court in Washington County, Utah.
Date of judgment to be reviewed here is August 30, 1993. Date
of Notice of Appeal is September 30, 1993.

V.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

All issues stated below constitute a claim of PLAIN ERROR.
Since the same standard of review appears to apply to all issues,
that standard and citations to authority thereto will be addressed,
after a phrasing of the issues, in V.B. below.
A.

ISSUES ON APPEAL:

1.

Whether Defendant was entitled to be advised fully of his

fundamental trial rights under the Constitution

of the United

States amends V, VX, and XIV, and under the Constitution of Utah
Art. I §§12 and 7, and other applicable law;
2.

Whether

Defendant

was

actually

advised

of

those

fundamental rights;
3.

Whether the" trial court's failure to advise defendant of

those fundamental rights in fact violated defendant's rights to due
process and fundamental trial rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and
5

Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and/or
under Art. I §§12 and 7 of the Utah State Constitution.
4.

Whether the trial court made a sufficient inquiry under

Rule 11, Utah Rules of Crim.P. and/or, as a matter of state and/or
federal law, otherwise made a proper determination as to whether
defendant's pleas of guilty were voluntary,

intelligent, and

knowing, and that he understood the consequences of a guilty plea.
5. Whether in the absence of either private legal counsel or
the right to appointed counsel and/or in the absence of being
advised of his fundamental trial rights, including the right to
appointed counsel, defendant's pleas of "guilty" to a Class A
misdemeanor and a Class B misdemeanor were in fact voluntary,
intelligent, and knowing.
6.

Whether

defendant

voluntarily,

knowingly,

and

intelligently waived his right to counsel, regardless of whether
appointed

or

private,

voluntarily,

and

intelligently

whether
and

he

made

knowingly,

a

real

as

to

choice,
self-

representation.
7.

Whether the trial court's failure to properly determine

whether defendant's pleas of "guilty" to a Class-A misdemeanor and
a Class "B" misdemeanor were voluntary, intelligent, and knowing in
fact violated defendant's rights to due process and fundamental
trial rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth amendments to
6

the United States Constitution and/or under Art. I §§12 and 7 of
the Utah State Constitution.
8.
the

Whether Appellant-Defendant was denied his right, under

Sixth

and

Fourteenth

Amendments

of

the

United

States

Constitution, and under Utah Const. Art. I §12, to assistance of
counsel by the trial court's failure or refusal to do one or more
of the following:
(a)

advise defendant of his right to assistance of counsel

and of his right to court-appointed counsel if he was indigent
or could not afford to hire a lawyer.
(b)

conduct

an

inquiry

into

defendant's

indigency

to

determine whether defendant was entitled to court-appointed
counsel.
(c)

appoint counsel to represent defendant.

(d)

advise defendant that defendant could either represent

himself or hire private counsel or, rf defendant could not
afford to hire private counsel, that he had the right to be
provided at no cost to himself court-appointed counsel, and
then conduct an inquiry into defendant's indigency.
(e)

determine whether defendant's self-representation was

done voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly on his part.
9.

Whether the trial court met its affirmative duty to

determine whether defendant, who was representing himself, did so
7

knowingly and intelligently.
B.

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW AND AUTHORITY

Each of the issues above, and particularly when considered in
toto, constitutes a claim of PLAIN ERROR.
Appellant alleges that for each issue
(a)

an error exists;

(b)

the error should have been obvious to the trial court,

and
(c)

the error was harmful (i.e., absent the error, there is

a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the
complaining party.
See State v. Reyes, 220 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (Utah Ct. App. ;
filed September 1, 1993).
By a "plain error" standard

it is not necessary

to give

deference to the trial court's ruling or judgment when there is an
absence in the record of any indication whatsoever that the trial
court even addressed the fundamental trial rights of defendant,
including the question of his indigency and entitlement to courtappointed counsel.

VI.
A.

VERBATIM PRODUCTION OF DETERMINATIVE LAW

UNITED STATES CONST, amend V:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
8

indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.
UNITED STATES CONST, amend VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
UNITED STATES CONST, amend XIV:
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
CONST. OF UTAH Art. I §7:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
CONST. OF UTAH Art. I §12:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to
9

have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled
to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense.
UTAH CODE ANN. 77-32-1:
The following are minimum standards to be provided
by each county, city and town for the defense of indigent
persons in criminal cases in the courts and various
administrative bodies of the state:
(1) Provide counsel for every indigent person who
faces
the
substantial
probability
of
the
deprivation of his liberty;
(2)
Afford timely representation by competent
legal counsel;
(3) Provide the investigatory and other facilities
necessary for a complete defense;
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to
the client; and
(5) Include the taking of a first appeal of right
and the prosecuting of other remedies before or
after a conviction, considered by the defending
counsel to be in the interest of justice except for
other and subsequent discretionary appeals or
discretionary writ proceedings.
UTAH CODE ANN §77-1-6:
(1)

In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by
counsel;
(b)
To receive a copy of the accusation filed
against him;
(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e)
To have compulsory process to insure the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf;
10

(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury
of the county or district where the offense is
alleged to have been committed;
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h)
To be admitted to bail in accordance with
provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial within
30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail
and if the business of the court permits•
(2)

In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for
the same offense;
(b)
No accused person shall, before final
judgment,'be compelled to advance money or fees to
secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the
laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights
when received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence
against himself;
(d)
A wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband nor a husband against his wife;
and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict
of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest,
or upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury
has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon
a judgment by a magistrate.

[All rights are listed here because defendant was not advised
by the court of any of these rights. However, U.C.A. §77-1-6(2)(b)
and 2(c) appear to have been denied to defendant regardless of
whether the court made defendant aware of his fundamental rights]:
H.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 8(a).
A defendant charged with a public offense has the
right to self representation, and if indigent, has the
right to court-appointed counsel if the defendant faces
a substantial probability of deprivation of liberty.

I.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11.

[See Appendix A as Rule 11 is lengthy. Especially pertinent
are the portions of Rule 11 set forth below]:
Rule 11(a)
11

Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant
shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant
waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be
required to plead until the defendant has had a
reasonable time to confer with counsel.
Rule 11(e)
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no
contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept
the plea until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he
or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does
not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption
of innocence, the right against compulsory selfincrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before
an impartial jury, the right to confront and crossexamine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the
right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and
that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of
the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial
the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the
plea is an admission of all those elements;
(5)
the defendant knows the minimum and maximum
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature
of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each
offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences.
J.

UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-204:
A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor
be sentenced to imprisonment as follows:
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term
exceeding one year;
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a term
exceeding six months;
(3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, for a term
exceeding ninety days.
12

may
not
not
not

K.

UCA §76-3-401(3) :
A court may impose consecutive sentences for
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode as
defined in Section 76-1-401.

VII.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case; Course of Proceedings; and Disposition
in District Court below:
This is a two-count criminal case brought by the State of Utah
in the Fifth Judicial District in and for Washington County.
Defendant-Appellant Neal Elliot Hollingsworth was charged with
assault, a Class-B misdemeanor, in Count I, and with "violations of
the conditions for release after arrest for domestic violence", a
Class-A misdemeanor, in Count II.
The charges carry a maximum penalty of six months and one year
of incarceration, respectively, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 7 6-3204(a) and (b) . The charges are not treated as infractions for any
purpose and it is possible that the charges could result in maximum
incarceration of one and one-half years, if consecutive pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. 76-3-401(3) (in fact this is the case).
On

June

28, 1993, defendant

was

arraigned

in

the

Fifth

Judicial District Court. He was advised of the two charges but was
not advised of any of his basic trial rights or of his rights to
counsel.

No inquiry into defendant's indigency was made nor Rule
13

11 colloquy done in any respect.

No "Statement of Defendant"

outlining rights was initialled or executed or prepared. Defendant
was alone and unrepresented by counsel. No determination was made
as to whether defendant's apparent "decision" to represent himself
was voluntary, or knowingly, and intelligently made.
The Court entered defendant's plea forthwith, after some
hearsay "evidence" suggested by the state's prosecutor.

June 28,

1993 Tr.4:11-15.
No other proceeding occurred until August 27, 1993, when
defendant, unrepresented and still not having been advised of his
fundamental trial rights, including right to counsel, appeared
alone, entered a brief but interrupted statement, and was sentenced
to consecutive jail terms totalling one and one-half years in the
Washington County Jail.

The Court made it clear that sentencing

was on "the original charge of abuse and violation of protective
order."

Aug. 27, 1993 Tr.3:19-22.

This appeal was filed on September 20, 1993.

B.

Statement of Facts.

part VII-A above states the relevant portions of the record.
Rather than restate the above, Appellant respectfully refers this
court to the entire record, which is only six-and-one-half pages of
the official transcript, and which is attached hereto as Appendices
14

B and C, respectively.
The underlying issues in this case go to the absence of facts
and to the absence of a record.
Accordingly, Appendix B (June 28, 1993 Tr.pp 2-6 inclusive and
Appendix C (August 27, 1993, Tr. 2-4) make it very clear that the
trial court did not advise defendant of his trial rights, right to
counsel, or any of the other issues raised in this appeal.

VIII.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Under the constitutions, laws, and cases of the United States
and of the State of Utah, a defendant in a criminal case must be
advised of his fundamental trial rights, be provided counsel if
indigent, should be advised of his right to counsel if he cannot
afford counsel, and otherwise by law, particularly by Rule 11(e),
Utah R.Crim.Proc.
Defendant Neil Hollingsworth was not advised of his rights; no
Rule 11 colloquy was held; he was not provided an attorney at any
stage of the proceedings; he was even cut off from making a
statement at sentencing; no inquiry as to whether his plea of
guilty or self-representation were done in a voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent manner.
Defendant's eighteen-month sentence under circumstances set
forth above blatantly violate federal and state constitutions, as
15

set forth herein.

Defendant

should

be ordered

custody and his conviction should be reversed.

released

from

Because of the

severity and breath of his due process violations and substantial
jail time served, and because the culmination of plain error was so
obvious and preventable, and to deter further lapses of judicial
and state compliance with laws,
court to dismiss

this

this court should order the trial

case with

prejudice

and

on the

merits

forthwith.

IX.
A.

ARGUMENT

Defendant was not advised of his fundamental trial rights.

As a result, his conviction should be reversed.
It

is

fundamental

that

in

Utah

"a

trial

court

commits

reversible error if it does not comply strictly with Rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure11.

State v. Abeyta, 212 Utah

Adv.Rep. 10 (Utah 1993), citing State y^_ Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309
(Utah 1987).

In State v. Dastrup, 818 P.2d

594, this

court

reversed and remanded even after a colloquy because the trial court
did not ask defendant on the record

if he understood

that by

pleading guilty he was waiving his fundamental rights. See Dastrup
at 595.

In accord "with strict scrutiny of the plea process is

Bovkin v. Alabama. 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969):
What is at stake for an accused facing death or
imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are
16

capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure
he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of
its consequence. When the judge discharges that function, he
leaves a record adequate for any review that may be later
sought and forestalls the spin-off of collateral proceedings
that seek to probe murky memories.
Id at 243-44,
In the instant case the record is totally devoid of any of the
following in taking defendant's plea or in arraignment or any other
time:

(1) that defendant has knowingly waived the right to counsel

and does not desire counsel; (2) the plea is voluntarily made; (3)
the defendant knows the right to presumption of innocence, the
right against compulsory self-incrimination, or any of the other
rights set forth in Rule 11(3) (3); (4) that defendant knew the
minimum and maximum sentence, or any of the other requirements of
Rule 11(e)(5).
The Court did appear to read both counts of the Information
(June 28, 1993 Tr. 2:11-3:22) , but it is not clear that defendant
did in fact understand Count II, the more serious charge, which
arose from a civil restraining order (June 28, 1993 Tr: 3:4-5).
After trying unsuccessfully to explain Count II to defendant,
the Court merely said:
Do you wish to enter a plea at this time, or do you want
time to talk to an attorney?
June 28, 1993 Tr. 3:23-24.

Mr. Hollingsworth then stated "I'll enter a plea.11 Tr. 3:25.
17

After

entering

the

plea

(Tr.4:2)

the

Court

admonished

defendant, listened to hearsay "testimony" from the prosecutor, and
postponed sentencing.

Tr 4:3-5-5:13.

The hearing concluded then.

Not only was there no record of a Rule 11 colloquy, but there
was also no affidavit of defendant or other evidence showing in any
way that defendant understood his fundamental trial rights as set
forth in Rule 11(e)(5)(c-e).

In State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332

(Utah App. 1989), this court mandated reversal of the conviction,
even though in that case there was some affidavit.

In the instant

case there was neither a guilty plea affidavit nor colloquy from
the bench, mandating even more strongly that this case should be at
least reversed.

Since the errors were so obvious and "plain", and

unjust, justice would be done if this court not only reversed but
also ordered dismissal of the instant case with prejudice and on
the merits upon remand to the trial court.

Defendant does not

demand

Maguire,

the

Adv.Rep.39

strictness
(1992),

but

sought
does

in

State

insist

v.

upon

strict

184

scrutiny

Utah
and

fundamental fairness when it comes to trial rights guaranteed under
the Constitution of the United States and of Utah as specifically
cited above.

B.

Defendant

did

not

knowingly.

intelligently waive his right to legal counsel.
18

voluntarily,

and

At the June 28, 1993 arraignment defendant was not advised in
any way about his right to counsel nor advised of the consequences
of entering a plea unrepresented.

Neither was an inquiry, much

less a finding, made regarding the "choice" defendant had to go
forward

unrepresented,

nor

whether

his

decision

to

represent

himself was voluntary, knowingly, and intelligently made.
The determinative case on point is State v. Bakalov, 224 Utah
Adv.Rep.13

(1993).

In

Bakalov,

the

Utah

Supreme

Court,

on

certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals, upheld this court's ruling
in State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629 (Utah Ct.App.1993).
The Utah Supreme Court left no doubt as to the issues raised
in

Sixth

and

Fourteenth

Amendment

assistance

of

counsel

requirements, nor of the Utah Constitutional counterpart in Art. I
§§7 and 12:
Precedent is clear.
Defendants who knowingly and
intelligently waive their right to assistance of counsel must
be allowed to conduct their own defense.... [The trial court]
never advised Dr. Bakalov of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation....advice. [Emphasis added].
Id at 13.
State v. Ramirez, 818 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) is in accord and
states that "the only fair way to proceed is to vacate defendant's
conviction and remand the matter for retrial."

(Cited in Bakalov,

supra. at 13).
The record in the instant case—or lack of record—speaks for
19

itself.

No

attempted.

such

colloquy

or determination

was made

or

even

It is precisely cases like the instant one, where a

naive young man without legal counsel and without even minimum
required protection from the court and ends up with a year and a
half of incarceration, where these protective principles are most
needed in application.
Because Mr. Hollingsworth1s due process violations were so
plain and obvious, this court should not merely remand him back to
a Kafkaesque trial environment for "redetermination,11 but should
send a clear message to the legal system that plain and obvious
error requires dismissal with prejudice and on the merits.

Such

deterrence has worked to deter overreaching police conduct, and
should be considered now in other areas of the justice system.

C.

Defendant was not advised of his right to counsel nor to

his right to court-appointed

counsel

nor was he provided

any

counsel whatsoever.
The record, again, speaks for itself on this issue by its
silence.

The

only

reference

anywhere

to

the

issue

of

Mr.

Hollingsworth1 s counsel is found in the June 28, 1993 transcript at
3:23-25:
[THE COURT]...Do you wish to enter a plea at this time, or do
you want time to talk to an attorney?
MR. HOLLINGSWORTH:

I'll enter a plea.
20

That's all of i t — i n its entirety.
The record suggests strongly here that in being denied his
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, Mr. Hollingsworth
was denied due process under the Fourteenth amendment and was also
denied his right to not be compelled in a criminal case to be a
witness against himself, thus violating the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Further, in being

placed in a position, unprotected, whereby Mr. Hollingsworth gave
evidence against himself, without the voluntariness, intelligence,
and

knowingness

of

his

plea

having

being

established,

Mr.

Hollingsworth was also denied his rights under Art. I sections
seven and twelve of the Utah Constitution.
The case law seems quite clear that in a misdemeanor case
where a defendant may be punished with six months or more in jail
or prison, that the Sixth Amendment mandates appointment of counsel
if defendant is indigent.

Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32

L.Ed.2d 530, 92 S.Ct 2006 (1972).

In Argersinger, the Court was

especially careful to point out that because of the "assembly-line
character of misdemeanor proceedings", assistance of counsel may be
especially important.

Further, Argersinger suggests that a trial

judge may choose to hot appoint counsel in misdemeanor cases but if
it does not then imprisonment is forfeited as a sentencing option.
See Argersinger at 536, where the Argersinger majority cited Iri re
21

Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 92 L.Ed. 682, 68 S.Ct. 499, whereby even a
sentence of sixty days maximum required assurance that an indigent
defendant in a criminal case had either been represented by counsel
or had voluntarily and knowingly waived such counsel.
The subsequent refinements to Argersinger do not apply to the
facts

in this case.

In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 59

L.Ed.2d 383, 99 S.Ct. 1158, the Supreme Court held that a state
court is not required to appoint counsel where imprisonment is
authorized for a particular offense, but not actually imposed.

In

the instant case, eighteen months was actually imposed.
Utah

law requires no less than the federal standard, and

perhaps substantially more.

In Webster v. Jones, 587 P. 2d 528

(1978) , the Utah Supreme Court held that the court must determine,
as a question of fact, whether defendant is able to hire his own
counsel.

Id at 530. While the Code section relied upon in Webster

appears to have been repealed, there is no indication that the
principles involved in Webster are therefore moot or of no effect.
That effectiveness should also apply to the mandatory

language

relied upon by the Court requiring the determination of indigency
to be made by the Court at the time of first appearance.

Any

"election11 given the* Couft cannot go beyond current federal law in
any event, and defendant is aware of no federal caselaw permitting
a defendant to be incarcerated for eighteen months without even an
22

inquiry

into

indigency

or

other

basic

Sixth

and

Fourteenth

Amendment protections.
Further,

Appellant

herein

incorporates

all

arguments

in

preceding sections of this appeal, including the absence of any
Rule 11 colloquy.

Mr. Hollingsworth was not found to be indigent

nor to have voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived his
right to counsel as required in State v. Gibbons, supra, and other
law such as State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d. 1332 (Utah App. 1989) and
in U.C.A. §77-35-11(5), particularly Rule 11(5) (now Rule 11(e).
Further it is the burden of the trial court, not defendant or even
of his counsel, if he has counsel, to establish compliance with
Rule 11.

Gibbons, supra, at 1312, citing Boykin v. Alabama.

If

this burden is so where a defendant has legal counsel, then how
much more then is it required in the total absence of any legal
counsel?

CONCLUSION
Appellant-Defendant Neil Hollingsworth was charged, and then
sentenced to eighteen months incarceration, with no inquiry made by
the trial court as to his indigency, nor whether a waiver of
counsel,

if

voluntarily.

any, * was

done

knowingly,

intelligently,

and

Mr. Hollingsworth was not advised of any of his trial

rights, even in a crude approximation of Rule 11(e) requirements.
23

He

was

sentenced

abruptly

without

even

being

able

to

argue

mitigation, because he had no legal counsel to advocate for him at
any critical stage, much less all of them.
Appellant was thus denied his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his due
process and trial rights under Article I sections Seven and Twelve
of the Utah Constitution.

He is at least entitled to full reversal

of the judgment and sentence.

Further, since this combination of

plain error should have been so obvious to the court and to the
State, Appellant should not be required to return to a hostile rearraignment, trial, and possibly more incarceration.

This court,

accordingly, should also order dismissal of the charges against Mr.
Hollingsworth, on the merits and with prejudice, to deter such
treatment

of

accused

citizens

in the

future, where plain

and

obvious error continues to exist undeterred.
Respectfully submitted this

s\^>

day of

i^T/Crz://^6:

1993.

R. CLAYTON HUNTSMAN
Attorney for Appellant-Defendant

CERTIFICATE OJ/^ERVICE^BY MAILING
On the /IJ
day of ([/ ^IAS^AA/^J
, 1993, I do hereby
certify that I mailed a true and complete copy of the above and
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foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT-DEFENDANT by placing same in the
United States Post Office, postage prepaid, to the following, to
wit:
Jan Graham
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

z

Eric Ludlow
Washington County Attorney
178 North 200 East
C,cKs^
St. George, Utah 84770

\YTOVl HUNTSMAN

iy for Appellant-Defendant
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Cross-References.
U R C r P 30

Harmless

error,

R u l e 11

Rights of accused, Utah Const., Art. I, ^§ 7
to 13, $ 77-1-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Additional time to plead.
Waiver of objections
Additional time to plead.
Where original information did not state
public offense and was amended so as to state
public offense for first time, as amending information in larceny prosecution so as to allege
ownership of property alleged to have been stoJan, it was equivalent of a new information requiring arraignment of defendant and his plea

thereto, and where defendant was not given
time to plead to such information, court committed reversible error State v Jensen, 83
Utah 452, 30 P 2d 203 (1934)
Waiver of objections.
Subdivision (c) merely reaffirms the general
legal rule that all objections, including those to
proceedings in the circuit court, must be made
before a guilty plea is entered or the objections
will be waived. State v Humphrey, 794 P 2d
496 (Utah Ct. App 1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 823 P 2d 464 (Utah 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur 2d Criminal
gw §§ 433 to 438
fcJ.S. — 22 C J.S. Criminal Law § 355 et

Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *=» 261(1),
263, 264.

title 11. Pleas.
fa) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be reprented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The
fendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonBe time to confer with counsel.
b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by
on of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill pursuant to Rule 21.5. A defen|t may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanjlf a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear,
|Court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
?A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
|When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
k
trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for
ly trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defenC„counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury
ie court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
3y ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
^1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowpy waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
&) the plea is voluntarily made;
|3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence,
fright against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy
ic trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-exami open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the atten> of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are
**>
*the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
^the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
i of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and
plea is an admission of all those elements;
Je defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
We, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence,
•y be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including
ability of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
*™e tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
and if so, what agreement has been reached;
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Rule 11
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(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for fift
motion to withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal it]
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any i_
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not al
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending tiieHf
make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other pa
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a le_
eluded offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement sKa
approved by the court.
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation
sentence is not binding on the court,
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any p
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, un
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative
ment and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the pi*
The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defe
counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved.
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be!
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defend
and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the pl|
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defe
dant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or a i
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to]
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defer
dant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(Amended effective May 1, 1993.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, redesignated
former Subdivisions (a) through (d) and (f) as
present Subdivisions (1) through (4) and (8),
respectively, and former Subdivision (e) as
Subdivisions (5) and (7); divided Subdivision
(1) into two sentences, substituting "The defendant may" for "and shall" at the beginning of
the present second sentence; substituted "may"
for "shall" in the introductory language of Subdivision (5); added "and" to the end of Subdivision (5)(f) and added Subdivision (5)(g); added
Subdivision (6); substituted "may" for "shall"
in Subdivision (8)(a); and made minor stylistic
changes throughout the rule.
The 1993 amendment, effective May 1, 1993,
revised the subdivision designations, substituting letters for numbers and vice versa; inserted

"or guilty and mentally ill" in the introductory
paragraph in Subdivision (e) and in Subdivi«
sion (f); rewrote Subdivision (e)(3) to list mom
rights; inserted "and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence" in Subdivision (e)(5); added Subdivision
(e)(8); deleted "that contemplates entry of a
plea in the expectation that other charges will
be dropped or dismissed" after "has been
reached" in Subdivision (h)(2); added Subdivision (i); and made stylistic changes throughout
the rule.
Cross-References. — Inadmissibility of
pleas, plea discussions or related statements,
Rule 410, U.R.E.
Time limit for filing motion to withdraw plea
of guilty or no contest, § 77-13-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Compliance with rule.
Guilty or no contest plea.
—Conditional pleas.
—Effect.
—Explanation sufficient.
—Failure to explain.
Consequences of plea.
Nature and elements of offense.
Right against self-incrimination.
—Judicial burden.
—Voluntariness.
Absence of finding.

Method of establishing.
—Withdrawal.
Plea agreements.
—Court's participation in negotiations
—Refusal of court to comply.
—Sentencing.
Cited.
Compliance with rule.
A trial court's failure to comply strictly with
this rule in accepting a guilty or no contest
plea is good cause, as a matter of law, for the
withdrawal of that plea. State v Gibbons. 740
P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), State v Smith, 812
P.2d 470 (Utah Ct. App! 1991)
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1

-oOo-

2
3
4

THE COURT:

5

Elliot Hollingsworth.

931500528, State of Utah versus Neal

6

Is that your full true and correct name?-

7

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH:

8

THE COURT: Your birth date is April the 9th,

9

Yes, Your Honor.

1973?

10

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH:

11

THE COURT: You're charged in Count I with

12

Yes, Your Honor.

assault, a Class B misdemeanor.

13

It's alleged that on or about the 26th day of

14

June, 1993, Washington County, Utah, you attempted with

15

unlawful force or violence to do bodily injury to another,

16

or you threatened, accompanied by a show of force, to do

17

bodily injury to another or committed an act with unlawful

18

force or violence that caused bodily injury under the

19

domestic violence statute.
Do you understand what you're being charged

20
21

with?

22

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH:

23

THE COURT:

Yes, I do.

In Count II, you're charged with

24

violation of the conditions for release after arrest for

25

domestic violence, a Class A misdemeanor.

The same date;

3
1

same place.

It's alleged that you violated a release

2

agreement that you signed after having been arrested on a

3

previous occasion for domestic violence.

4

Do you understand that charge?

5

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH:

6

THE COURT:

7
8

I

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH:
THE COURT:

—

Uh-huh.

you signed an agreement while you

were in jail as a condition of your release.

11
12

When you were arrested the first

time for spouse abuse —

9
10

No, I don't.

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH:

I —

I was —

I didn't go to

jail.

13

MS. MANLEY:

Your Honor, I think that in reading

14

the report it sounded that way to me.

15

in the Information that it was a violation of a protective

16

order.

17

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH:

20

THE COURT:

And I just noticed

That's —

Ohf a civil one?

Okay.

Yeah.
Then it was a civil

21

protective order issued by this court restraining you from

22

violence, and yet you violated that order.

23
24
25

Do you wish to enter a plea at this time, or do
you want time to talk to an attorney?
MR. HOLLINGSWORTH:

TDATTT

I'U enter a plea.

i~* Ayf/-iA/rrTT T TXT

4
1

THE COURT: And your plea?

2

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH:

3

THE COURT: Mr. Hollingsworth, it appears to the

4

Guilty, Your Honor.

Court that you might have a significant problem.

5

Were the children witness to this abuse?

6

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH:

7

THE COURT: Normal people don't go around

8

punching out each other.
MR. HOLLINGSWORTH:

9
10

punch her.

11
12

In my defense, I did not

I did not raise a fist to her.
MS. MANLEY:

Her claims are that he grabbed her

by the shoulders.

13

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH:

14

MS. MANLEY:

15

No, they weren't.

That's —

And she also indicates that he put

his hands around her throat and choked her.

16

THE COURT: That's not the way we deal with

17

problems, Mr. Hollingsworth.

18

people deal with problems.

19

That's not the way normal

He entered a plea of not guilty to the other

20

charge, and he's waiting trial which is scheduled for July

21

the 26th.

22
23
24
25

MS. MANLEY:

Would you like to just postpone

sentencing?
THE COURT: Why don't we just postpone
sentencing in the matter until you've completed your trial

T1ATTT

f\

"\ ITr*~K JTt TT T T X T

5
in the other case, Mr, Hollingsworth, and then we'll decide
what to do with you.
Either way, I think it would behoove you to get
involved in counseling as soon as possible before somebody
really gets hurt.

You know, last year we had six homicides

directly or indirectly related to spouse abuse situations.
Four suicides.

Lots of little kids left without moms or

without dads. And it's just reached epic proportions.
don't know what's happening to people.

I

They can't seem to

reason and solve their problems without violence.
Counseling is available to you, and it might —
it might prevent your hurting somebody very badly or them
hurting you, okay?
MR. HOLLINGSWORTH:
THE COURT:

Okay.

So with your permission, I'm going

to continue sentencing until after the other case is
resolved.
MR. HOLLINGSWORTH:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Okay.
Thanks.

(Whereupon the proceedings in the above-entitled
matter were concluded.)
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1

-oOo-

2
3

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

4
5

27th day of August, 1993, and the time is 1:33.
The first matter on the calendar is 931500528,

6
7

State of Utah versus Neal Elliot Hollingsworth.
MR. ROWE:

8
9

It's Friday, the

Your Honor, it came to our attention

that he had not been sentenced on this case before the

10

Court.

You had continued it to see what the outcome of the

11

sentence Judge Eves was going to impose, and apparently

12

this got lost in the shuffle and didn't get discovered

13

until he came along in the district court on some motions

14

on a third case. And —
THE COURT:

15

Yes.

I did do some research on this

16

scenario.

The way this happened, this incident is alleged

17

to have occurred on June the 26th, and Mr. Hollingsworth

18

entered pleas of guilty to both the original charge of

19

spouse abuse and violation of a protective order.

20

Judge Eves sentenced him in July on an additional charge of

21

abuse —

Then

——

22

MR. ROWE: He

23

THE COURT: -- evidently not knowing that guilty

24

pleas had been entered in this case and ordered him to

25

probat:ion and counseling with Rickell James-Irish.

I note

3
that she has reported in that case noncompliance.
MR. ROWE:

That's correct.

THE COURT:

And then there's a new incident

alleged, more aggravated than either of these two.
What is your recommendation?
MR. ROWE:

I'm recommending that he be sentenced

to six months jail, consecutive on each count, subject to
review.
THE COURT: Anything you'd like to say,
Mr. Ho11ingsworth?
MR. HOLLINGSWORTH:

I have every intention of

obeying the orders to go to those classes. And I even
called the place and —
personally.

I didn't talk to Rickell

It must have been to her secretary.

And I

explained to her that I couldn't make it on one week,
because I was working late. And she said —

she took my

phone number and said she would call me the next week.

And

on the next week, I was —
THE COURT: Well, that's not why you're here
today.

You're not here for not complying with the order,

you're here to be sentenced on the original charge of abuse
and violation of a protective order.
And by my count, we have four or five separate
incidents involving violence; is that not correct?
MR. ROWE:

Yes.

riATTT

We have at least three.

/->

-»*-.

And I

4
would —

I think the most aggravated factor is that he's —

in this latest one, he and/or his counselor are attempting
to minimize his knowledge of —

that he was restrained from

engaging in this type of activity.

And the clear defiance

of the court order doesn't seem to get his attention.

So I

don't know what else we can do but keep him out of society.
THE COURT:

It will be the judgment and sentence

of the Court, Mr. Hollingsworth, that on Count I, you serve
six months in the Washington County Jail.

On Count II, you

serve one year in the Washington County Jail.
will be consecutive.

Those cases

Those sentences will be consecutive.

I will, however, review after the first year.
(Whereupon the proceedings in the above-entitled
matter were concluded.)
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